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Drugs are associated with many harms (Bennett & Holloway, 2007; Nutt, King, &
Phillips, 2010). Governments seek to reduce these problems for the greater good, though the
best strategy is debatable. Policy-relevant research on drugs, or the “field” for short, informs the
conversation (see, e.g., Brownstein, 2013, 2016; MacCoun & Reuter, 2001; Nutt, 2012; Zimring
& Hawkins, 1992). Largely, the field is “Epicurean.” To explain what that means, allow a bit of
background (also see Strodach, 2012; Warren, 2009). Epicurus was a Greek philosopher who
lived around 300 BC. He is known for devising hedonism. However, he did not think of this
moral philosophy like we do today: as the pursuit of pleasure. Rather, Epicurus (2012) saw the
greatest good as the elimination of pain. Thus, research is Epicurean if it focuses on pain.
Among criminologists, the emphasis on pain is more often attributed to another
philosopher, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Like Epicurus, Bentham was a hedonist (Gere,
2017; Moen, 2015; Scarre, 1994). He spent his life thinking about the best way to govern
(Schofield, 2009). Doing so, he argues, entails minimizing people’s pain, but also maximizing
their pleasure. Unlike Epicurus, Bentham (2005 [1789]) put pleasure on equal footing as a
guiding moral principle. For him, the morally right thing to do is that which prevents pain and
promotes pleasure in their many manifestations. Of course, drugs are not only associated pain,
but also pleasure (Dennis & Farrugia, 2017; Holt & Treloar, 2008; O’Malley & Valverde, 2004).
Yet, the field is not Benthamian: proportionately focused on pain and pleasure.
Not everyone will think the field should be Benthamian. It is a philosophical choice
without a single right answer. Indeed, some scholars, government officials, and laypersons
believe pleasure should not, or practically will not, be a serious consideration in real-world
efforts to control drugs (see Kleiman, Caulkins, & Hawken, 2011: 137-8). It follows that research
on drug-involved pleasure is of little to no importance. In turn, that means the field is “right” to be
Epicurean, not Benthamian. But that view is mistaken. Because drug-involved pleasure and
pain are opposites, better theoretical and empirical knowledge of the latter is generated from

better understanding the former, and vice versa (see also, Author, XXXXa; Fleck 1979: 102). In
turn, that information may be used to better control drug-involved pain.
With that logic in mind, this article seeks to improve the field’s approach to identifying,
categorizing, and connecting cases of drug-involved pleasure and pain. The goal is to provide
researchers with a wider “conceptual lens” for examining not only drug-involved pain, nor only
drug-involved pleasure, but both with respect to one another. Toward that end, first I lay the
groundwork by describing existing typologies of drug-involved pleasure, crime, and harm. Next,
I propose typologies of drug-involved pain and pleasure consisting of four types: drug-specific
corporal; drug-related corporal; economic; and, social. I illustrate each concept with findings
from a different body of literature. I conclude by discussing implications for the field.

Existing Typologies
To my knowledge, there are only two published drug-involved pleasure typologies. Holt
and Treloar (2008) describe one thusly:
There are two broad approaches to conceptualising the pleasures associated with drugs.
One approach sees pleasures as a sensation or conscious experienced produced by
substance use. … The other approach sees the pleasures derived from drug use as
inextricably linked to the ways in which drugs are used, the activities associated with
their use and contexts in which they are expressed and understood. (p. 350)
A limitation of this typology is it only covers a single type of drug-involved pleasure, specifically
physical and mental aspects (i.e., what I term “corporal”), but other types are relevant to the field
(i.e., what I term “economic” and “social”). Thus, this typology lacks comprehensiveness.
Bunton and Coveney’s (2011) drug-involved pleasure typology is more encompassing.
They list four types: carnal; disciplined; ascetic; and, ecstatic. These refer, respectively, to
pleasure “involv[ing] bodily basics and fleshy desires” (p. 13); “that has been rationalized” (p.
14); “the practice of … self-discipline” (p. 15); and, “in spiritual ceremonies” (p. 16). These
concepts are interesting, but, owing to being esoteric, it is hard to imagine their widespread

adoption among researchers in the field, much less policymakers and enforcers. This typology,
then, lacks instrumentality, or usability in the real world (see Cooney and Phillips, 2002).
My drug-involved pleasure typology – presented in the next section – is more
comprehensive than that of Holt and Treloar (2008), and more instrumental than that of Bunton
and Coveney (2011). Moreover, its instrumentality is bolstered by being based on two
prominent, instrumental typologies: those of drug-involved crime and harm, described directly
below. By connecting my typology of drug-involved pleasure to typologies of crime and harm,
researchers, policymakers and enforcers should be more likely to see and consider its
possibilities for informing drug control.
First is the drug-involved crime typology, which is explicitly or implicitly adopted by many
governments (Bennett & Holloway, 2007; BJS, 1994; Zimring & Hawkins, 1992). See figure 1.
Its broadest concept is drug-involved crime. There are two types of drug-involved crime: drugdefined and drug-related. Drug-defined crime encompasses acts formally prohibited and
inextricably involving a drug. Thus, subtypes of drug-defined crime include various forms of illicit
possession, distribution, and production of drugs, among potentially others. Drug-related crime
refers to offenses that do not inextricably involve a drug (e.g., robbery, burglary, fraud), but one
is involved. Drug-related crime is psychopharmacological if due to consumption of a drug;
economic compulsive if committed to afford a drug; and, systemic if attributed to the anarchy of
black-market trade (Goldstein, 1985; also see Brownstein, 1993).
--FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE-Second is the drug-involved harm typology, exemplified in Nutt, King, and Phillips’
(2010) Lancet article (also see Nutt, 2012). See figure 2. Its broadest concept is drug-involved
harm, which is the sum of harm to users and harm to others. Each of those harms may be
physical, psychological, or social. Also, Nutt, King, and Phillips (2010) provide a list of specific
physical, psychological, and social harms to users and others.

Among users, the subtypes of physical harm are drug-specific mortality, drug-related
mortality, drug-specific damage, and drug-related damage. Also for users, the subtypes of
psychological harm are drug-specific impairment of mental functioning, drug-related impairment
of mental functioning, and dependence. The subtypes of social harm incurred by users are loss
of tangibles and loss of relationships.
For others, the only specified subtype of physical and psychological harm is injury.
Social harm is more varied among others. Its subtypes consist of (acquisitive) crime,
environmental damage, family adversities, international damage, economic cost, and harm to
the community.
In panel 1 of their article, Nutt, King, and Phillips (201) define the specific phenomena
and provide examples. I reworked it into table 1 to demonstrate the harm typology’s
comprehensiveness.
--FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE---TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE-Clearly, the harm framework is more comprehensive than the crime framework.
Comprehensiveness is valuable in its own right, but also because it relates to power. As Cooney
and Phillips (2002) explain:
[A] good typology is powerful – it allows the facts to be better explained. The typology
itself provides no explanation – it merely orders reality – but it creates categories that
may liberate a theory or model to explain a set of empirical findings more fully. The more
facts a typology permits to be explained, the more powerful, and the more scientifically
valuable, it is. (p. 78)
Comprehensiveness boosts power to the extent that a typology’s exhaustiveness and abstract
connections facilitate cross-fertilization: theories of and findings on one phenomenon (i.e., part
of the typology) shed light on others.

Creating Typologies
My goal is not to produce a typology of drug-involved pleasure for its own sake. Rather,
as a criminologist interested in the field, my goal is to unlock the power of drug-involved
pleasure for improving the study of drug-involved crime and harm. Obtaining said power
requires building a coherent conceptual bridge between the “good” and “bad” phenomena
associated with drugs. This bridge will foster the ability for knowledge of drug-involved pleasure
to inform its “evil” opposite, and vice versa, as opposed to remaining isolated on proverbial
islands of knowledge.

Flipping I
There a variety of ways to increase comprehensiveness and power. One approach is
“flipping” an existing typology’s concepts. By flip, I mean devising the mirror opposites of
existing concepts. The result is a conceptual dichotomy, such as “good and bad guys” or “war
and peace.” Those broad types may have subtypes that are mirror opposites, too. Among good
and bad guys, for instance, the converse of lovers are fighters, of anonymous gift givers are
burglars, and of honest businesspersons are defrauders (e.g., Jacques & Wright, 2015). I refer
to two mirroring typologies as a “framework.” Compared to any given typology on its own (i.e.,
not explicitly connected to a mirrored version), a framework is more comprehensive and
powerful because, one, more is encompassed and, two, knowledge of each typology bears on
its mirrored opposite.
Flipping may be straightforward, but does not always produce a valid outcome. Close to
a decade ago, for instance, I attempted to flip Goldstein’s (1985) drug-related violence typology
by proposing a drug-related love typology. It consisted of three concepts:
psychopharmacological love, economic compulsive love, and systemic love. The problem was
systemic love never struck me as a sufficiently valid concept, so I abandoned that approach
without publishing it.

In other cases, flipping works well. For example, it is reasonable to flip harm into
“pleasure” or a synonym, like “help,” thereby creating a framework of drug-involved harm/help
based on Nutt, King, and Phillips (2010). Proposing and illustrating such a framework would be
a contribution to the field. I considered taking that path, but, first, I wanted to see if I could
produce a better framework. Already, I have listed a few traits that make a typology “better”:
instrumentality, comprehensiveness, and power (Cooney & Phillips, 2002; Bailey, 1994. Two
other traits are simplicity (i.e., parsimony, elegance), summed up by the maxim “less is more,”
and generality, meaning a concept applies more broadly (see Cooney & Phillips, 2002; as
relates to theory, see Kuhn, 1977).

Synthesizing
In addition to flipping, another approach to improving conceptual knowledge is
synthesizing existing typologies. In my attempt to improve upon the harm/help framework, I
looked for ways to synthesize it with the crime typology. On and off for years, I tinkered with and
trashed synthesized versions. Below, I describe the final train of thought that led to my typology
of drug-involved pain, which then I flipped to produce a typology of drug-involved pleasure.
Together, they form a framework of drug-involved pain/pleasure.
Before describing the outcome, note that a synthesized typology or framework has value
distinct from the aforementioned evaluative criteria. The unique synthetic value hinges on the
ability to connect otherwise disparate areas of research, such as those of public health
researchers (inclined to use the harm typology) and criminologists (apt to use the crime
typology). A synthesis of their respective conceptualizations amounts to a reduction in the social
distance between them, which, in theory, should increase interest in the other’s findings,
theories, and so on (Black, 2000). Thus, it is advantageous to have a third framework that
bridges the crime and harm frameworks, especially if the new framework is equal to or, more so,
better than them. This bridging is another aspect of instrumentality, as it improves usefulness.

The first step in creating the typology was to choose an overarching (i.e., first-level)
concept. As noted above, harm is more encompassing than crime, so I chose the former to be
my first-level concept. Note that to linguistically differentiate the harm framework from my own, I
refer to “harm” with a synonym – “pain.” Herein, both are broadly defined as anything perceived
as bad (see Bentham, 2005 [1789]: 42).
The next step was choosing second-level concepts (i.e., subtypes of the first-level
concept). Recall that in the harm typology, the second-level concepts are harm to users and
harm to others; in the crime typology, they are drug-defined crime and drug-related crime. Given
my first-level concept drew from the harm typology, I explored synthetic possibilities by adopting
something in line with the crime typology’s drug-defined versus drug-related distinction.
However, instead of use the word “defined,” I gave a nod to the harm typology by using the
word “specific,” which further serves to linguistically synthesize the typologies. Ergo, the pain
typology’s first set of subtypes were, initially, “drug-specific pain” and “drug-related pain.” These
are defined, respectively, as pains directly tied to a drug (e.g., liver cirrhosis attributable to
alcohol consumption) and pains indirectly tied to a drug (e.g., drunken bar fight).
Subsequently, I considered how to draw on the harm and crime typologies’ third-level
concepts (i.e., subtypes of the second-level concepts). In the harm typology, harms are
physical, psychological and social; in the crime typology, drug-defined offenses include
possession, distribution, and production (again, among potentially others), whereas drug-related
offenses are psychopharmacological, economic compulsive, and systemic. Because drugdefined offenses lack generality, I subtracted them from synthetic consideration. The basis for
this decision is examined in the next subsection, after which I return to synthesis.

Subtracting I
Removing parts of a typology, or subtracting, is a third way of improving conceptual
knowledge. Subtraction increases simplicity, which is good. Also, subtraction may increase

generality if it involves removing concept(s) that lack applicability, at least compared to the other
concept(s) within a typology. As expounded by Cooney and Phillips (2002, p. 79), “The more
settings to which a typology can be applied, the more general it is … And the more general it is,
the more scientifically useful it is. A typology that classifies violence” – or drug-involved
phenomena, for instance – “is therefore less useful than a typology that classifies …
[phenomena] in different societies in different times.”
Nutt, King, and Phillips’ (2010) and Goldstein’s (1985) respective subtypes of harm and
drug-related crime are more general than subtypes of drug-defined crime. Across time and
place, drugs may be associated with the subtypes of harm and drug-related crime delineated by
Nutt, King, and Phillips (2010) and Goldstein (1985). For example, today and in ancient
societies across the globe, consumption of alcohol may lead to psychopharmacological
violence, which is a physical harm to others. Within those typologies, the least general concept
is systemic crime. By definition, this phenomenon can only occur in state societies, and, more
narrowly, in those that prohibit drug distribution. Looking at it the other way, though, systemic
crime is a general concept insofar as it may be found in any state society that prohibits any drug
distribution.
Based on the same logic, the least general concepts reviewed to this point are the
subtypes of drug-defined crime. To explain why, first, note that like systemic crime, drug-defined
crime is (only) relevant in state societies that prohibit drug distribution. However, the subtypes of
drug-defined crime are far less general than their umbrella concept. The lack of generality stems
from many different governments having control over what drug-involved phenomena it defines
as illegal, including not only distribution but also many forms of production, possession, use,
and other actions. There is a vast degree of variability in what is illegal – and, thus, what are
subtypes of drug-defined crime – across jurisdictions (e.g., the United States versus Saudi
Arabia), and even within jurisdictions over time (e.g., Prohibition era versus before and after in

the United States). This means the subtypes of drug-defined crime are jurisdiction- and timespecific. As such, they lack generality.

Back to Synthesizing
To best explain the basis for my third-level concepts, allow me to reiterate part of this
article’s background and purpose: I am a criminologist; in criminology, the dominate typology of
drug-related crime is Goldstein’s (1985) typology; outside criminology, Nutt, King, and Phillips’
(2010) framework is prominent; both typologies have merit, and the latter can be used to
produce a framework of drug-involved harm/help; but I was curious about the prospect of
improving upon them; one technique for doing so is synthesis; among other potential benefits,
synthesis may reduce the social distance between researchers in different areas of inquiry –
such as public health and criminology – who, heretofore, use different typologies; the closing of
social distance should promote interdisciplinary knowledge of theories and findings, thereby
bettering the whole of scholarship on drug-involved issues.
Though I tried different synthetic arrangements, ultimately I adopted the third-level
concepts of the harm framework, with a few modifications. Instead of differentiate
“psychological” from “physical” pain, as do Nutt, King, and Phillips (2010), I grouped them into a
single category: corporal pain. This change reflects that the “mind” versus “body” distinction is
increasingly difficult to maintain in scientific research (Gallagher, 2006; Van der Kolk, 2014).
Corporal pain, then, is defined as that affecting the mind and body, i.e. psychological and
physical.1 Another option was to label corporal pain as “psychopharmacological,” thereby
drawing on Goldstein (1985), but that connotation is far too narrow. However, Goldstein’s (1985)
other terms are more workable. So, rather than refer to all other harm as “social,” ala Nutt, King,
and Phillips (2010), I split it into two types: economic pain and social pain, which loosely

1

Of course, if researchers see merit in the psychological/physical distinction, they may simply put them as
fourth-level concepts.

linguistically parallel Goldstein’s notions of economic compulsive and system crime. In my
typology, economic pain pertains to resources, including not only money but also social status
(e.g., education, criminal record). Social pain concerns interpersonal relationships and
communal networks.
The above process produced six types of drug-involved pain: drug-specific (1) corporal,
(2) economic, and (3) social; plus, drug-related (4) corporal, (5) economic, and (6) social; see
figure 3. However, this original formulation was no better than the harm typology in
comprehensiveness, power, simplicity, or generality, though arguably more instrumental by
narrowing the social distance between the harm typology and drug-related crime typology.
--FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE--

Subtracting II
From working on table 2, I realized it is possible to make the pain typology simpler than
the harm typology via subtraction, without any cost to comprehensiveness and power. To show
how, recall that table 1 is an adaptation of Nutt, King, and Phillips’ (2010) panel 1. In table 1,
their definitions and examples of drug-involved harm are fit into six cells: harm to users that is
(1) physical, (2) psychological, (3) social; or, to others that is (4) physical, (5) psychological, or
(6) social. To demonstrate that my pain typology is equally comprehensive as the harm
typology, I reclassified those definitions and examples as drug-specific or drug-related corporal,
economic, or social pain.
After completing table 2, I was struck by the lack of definitions and examples found
within the cells for drug-specific economic pain and drug-specific social pain. First, I considered
whether I mistakenly categorized any definitions and examples. That seems not to be the
problem. Rather, those cells are empty because there is no such thing as drug-specific
economic pain or drug-specific social pain. All economic or social pain associated with drugs is
inherently drug-related.

--TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE-In turn, that realization led to a reorganization of the pain typology that simplified it via
subtraction. Instead of have its second-level concepts be drug-specific pain and drug-related
pain, I changed them to corporal, economic, and social pain (i.e., I moved the third-level
concepts to the second-level). The drug-specific versus drug-related distinction was moved to
the third-level and only connected to corporal pain, as that distinction is irrelevant to economic
pain and social pain. Thus, the final formulation of the pain typology has four types: (1) drugspecific corporal, (2) drug-related corporal, (3) drug-related economic, and (4) drug-related
social; see figure 4. With only four types, the final formulation is simpler than the harm typology,
despite being equally comprehensive, powerful, and general, plus arguably more instrumental.
--FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE--

Flipping II
Satisfied with the final formulation of the pain typology, I flipped its key concepts to a
produce a drug-involved pleasure typology, which jointly make up a drug-involved pain/pleasure
framework.2 Because there are four types of pain, flipping results in four types of pleasure: (1)
drug-specific corporal, (2) drug-related corporal, (3) drug-related economic, and (4) drug-related
social; see figure 4. By “pleasure,” I mean anything perceived as good (see Bentham, 2005
[1789]: 42). Corporal pleasure is that affecting the mind and body; economic pleasure pertains
to resources; social pleasure concerns interpersonal relationships and communal networks.
Corporal pleasure is drug-specific if directly due to drug use, but drug-related if indirect.
Economic and social pleasure are only drug-related.

2

It could also be referred to as the utility framework, though I have opted not to do so herein because
different meanings of “utility” may produce unnecessary confusion among readers.

Illustrations of the Drug-Involved Pain/Pleasure Framework
I illustrate the four types of drug-involved pain/pleasure by drawing on different
literatures. To be clear, these illustrations are not “findings” or “results.” This is because they did
not inductively lead to the proposed typologies. Rather, and as explained above, the typologies
were “found” by synthesizing the harm and crime typologies, and flipping the product of that
synthesis. The result is a coherent, instrumental, comprehensive, powerful, and simple
conceptual framework for studying drug-involved pain and pleasure. That result is this article’s
contribution to the field.
Despite the proposed framework’s merits, readers may be unsure how to use it in their
research. At the most basic level, doing so requires identifying the concept(s) relevant to
phenomena being researched. To help scholars do so, the following subsections provide
examples. Owing to practical issues, the illustrations are necessarily limited. Word/page length
is always a limiting factor, but the bigger issue is that the framework encompasses all instances
of drug-involved pain and pleasure across time and place (i.e., maximally comprehensive).
Thus, it is impossible to provide anywhere near an exhaustive list of examples of each concept,
much less examine all of them in the span of an article. I will focus my efforts on four areas that
have been well researched: drug-specific corporal pain/pleasure among methamphetamine
users; drug-related corporal pain/pleasure tied to college student drinking and sexual behavior;
drug-related economic pain/pleasure pertaining to drug distribution; and, social pain/pleasure of
relationships and communities emanating from drugs. In addition to illustrating each concept, I
draw on these areas to demonstrate that the concepts can be used to organize and connect a
diversity of areas within a single framework, thereby aiding knowledge growth.
Before proceeding, I paraphrase Goldstein (1985: 494) so readers do not make more of
the concepts than intended: The four types of drug-involved pleasure and pain must be viewed
as ideal types. They are not mutually exclusive categories, but the overlap does not harm the
framework’s value for conceptually orientating research.

Drug-Specific Corporal Pain and Pleasure
Drug-induced pleasure is older than are we are – as a species (see Dudley, 2012). Until
relatively recently in history, people drank alcohol because it was safer than water, but also
because it produced pleasurable effects (Phillips, 2016). Alcohol intoxication may make a
person feel warm, cheery, and sexually aroused, all of which are examples of drug-specific
corporal pleasure. Of course, the same substance may cause corporal pain, too. An example is
the nausea that results from drinking more alcohol than the body, or mind, can handle.
As I write today, there is an opioid epidemic in the U.S. (Quinones, 2015), with a record
number of overdoses (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018). In 2016, for instance,
there were about 64,000 overdose deaths, a rate of nearly 20 per 100,000 persons. The year
before, there were more than 300,000 hospitalizations for nonfatal drug poisoning, with an ageadjusted rate of nearly 1 per 1,000 people. About two centuries ago, De Quincey’s (2003 [1821])
Confessions of an English Opium-Eater provided first hand insight into the utility of opioids (also
see, e.g., Bourgois & Schonberg, 2009; Courtwright, 2001a, 2001b). There are two parts to
Confessions. Part II is more important to the present article, as its sections include “Pleasures of
Opium” and “Pains of Opium.” In short, De Quincey’s use began as a way to reduce pain; he
found opium immensely pleasurable, so continued to use it; but, with time, he became addicted
and thus the pain associated with use mounted, whereas the pleasure depreciated.
Prior to the most recent opioid crisis, the drug-involved moral panic in the U.S. was over
methamphetamine (see Linnemann, 2016). Some of the drug-specific corporal effects are
visible, such as “meth mouth” (ibid.). The physical effects are internal, too. “My kidneys are
messed up” – said a heavy methamphetamine user – “My liver is messed up. I have really high
liver enzymes. I had thyroid trouble since this” (Brownstein, Mulcahy, & Huessy, 2014: 15).
Quantitatively, it is evident that methamphetamine remains a problem. In 2015, for example,

there were close to 15,000 hospitalizations for methamphetamine-related poisoning (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2018).
Like it or not, methamphetamine use is not entirely bad. To best illustrate the drug’s
positives, I should reiterate that pain and pleasure are conceptually distinct, and, thus, so too
are pain reduction and pleasure enhancement. For example, people may explain their
methamphetamine use as follows: “It was almost like a self-medication type of thing. … I almost
felt normal, as sick as that sounds” (Boeri, 2013: 43); and, “It just kind of drowns out all the
issues that I have” (p. 112; also see Carbone-Lopez, Owens, and Miller, 2012; Shukla, 2016).
Those are examples of pain reduction, but drug use may also be a matter of pleasure
enhancement. A methamphetamine user said of intoxication: “I felt great. … I felt powerful, I felt
confident and energized and just – made me feel good. I liked the way it made me feel …
because it made me feel confident. I had really low self-esteem … [And] crystal meth made me
… think about things really deeply. So you felt really intelligent and really smart” (Boeri, 2013:
53; also see Carbone-Lopez, Owens, & Miller, 2012; Shukla, 2016). Another methamphetamine
user spoke to both the pain reduction and pleasure enhancement effects:
[When doing meth] I wasn’t miserable anymore. [I was miserable because] we always
had financial problems. We never had enough money. … But then came along ice, and
no more depression, and no more pills, no more feeling sleepy. … [Meth] would give me
energy. Yeah, I’d get up, and clean the whole house up, and cook, have a big dinner
ready, and felt happy. You know, that’s the thing. That’s the devil in the
methamphetamine—because it makes you happy. … I was not doing enough to get the
high, high feeling. Just enough to [be like] wow, I feel great. I feel good. Let’s paint the
house. (Boeri, 2013: 56)
It is important not to conflate a drug’s legal status with its association to pain or pleasure.
There is not a one-to-one relationship between a drug’s utility and subjection to formal control.
This is the major conclusion of Nutt, King, and Phillips’ (2010) article. In their words, “Our
findings lend support to previous work in the UK and the Netherlands, confirming that the
present drug classification systems [i.e., law] have little relation to the evidence of harm” (p.
1564). To be clear, not every drug’s legal status is out of line with its harm. Heroin and

methamphetamine are among the most harmful and controlled substances. Yet alcohol and
tobacco are similarly harmful, but subject to much less control. Moreover, those regulated drugs
are considered much more harmful than prohibited ones, like ecstasy, LSD and psychedelic
mushrooms (ibid.). If utilitarianism is the moral guide, a drug’s pleasure should also be factored
into policy decisions about legality. Based on findings of the Global Drug Survey (2018a),
people score ecstasy, LSD, and psychedelic mushrooms as the most pleasurable drugs, but
alcohol and tobacco as the least (see also Global Drug Survey, 2018b). The implications are as
obvious as they are contra to current laws.

Drug-Related Corporal Pain and Pleasure
As with drug-specific corporal pleasure, the drug-related type affects the mind or body,
but the effect is indirect. I illustrate this concept with research on college students drinking
alcohol and then “hooking up,” a term that encompasses a wide range of consensual sexual
acts among non-committed, relative strangers (Bogle, 2008). Before doing so, I would be remiss
not to mention that drinking is a source of much pain among college students. Binge drinking
increases their risk of legal trouble, poor school performance, accidental injury, health problems,
and others (Vander Ven, 2011; Wechsler & Wuethrich, 2002; Weiss, 2013).
Furthermore, a large proportion of sexual assaults among them involve an intoxicated
offender or victim. A variety of studies suggest that half of sexual assaults are committed by
inebriated men; at the high end of estimates, this characterizes 80% of incidents (Abbey,
Zawacki, Buck, Clinton, & McAuslan, 2001; Zawacki, Abbey, Buck, McAuslan, & ClintonSherrod, 2003). Also, research consistently finds that students who binge drink are more likely
to have ever committed dating violence, as well as to commit it on a more frequent basis.
Statistics are better felt in personal stories, such as a female student who reported: “The
guy took advantage that I was wasted. I don’t quite remember. I passed out. I did not want it. I
felt horrible and used[,] and experienced physical pain for days” (Paul & Hayes, 2002: 653).

Another student recalled: “I (drunkenly) fell asleep and woke up with the person on top of me. …
He just mauled me in my drunken stupor. I wanted to cry and throw up. I felt used. The guy was
gross and totally took advantage of me” (p. 655).
Such incidents involve much pain. Studying drug-involved pleasure does not suggest
otherwise, nor does it discount drug-involved harms. Yet, it is important to research both sides
of the utility coin. Many alcohol-involved sexual occurrences are enjoyable, and, thus, fit the
mold of drug-related corporal pleasure. This relationship is well established in the literature on
college students hooking up. Among participants in a nationally representative sample of
college women, 40 percent agreed that “[g]oing out in a group, drinking a lot, and then having
sex is common at my college” (Glenn & Marquardt, 2001: 74). Consider the account of one
female college student:
We didn’t go out till like 11 p.m. and I had my first 2 drinks gone by 11:45. I got
intoxicated but not wasted. Mixed drinks (rum and coke) and tequila shots laced the
night of bar hopping. I ran into people I know and a guy I liked in particular. We hung out
with my friends for a while, then he and I went off alone. I was buying him beers to get
him to stay and hang out with me because I wanted to see what would happen between
us. At 2:00 a.m. when the bars closed we decided to go to his house … We smoked pot,
drank more, then had sex. I was drunk; however, I do not regret it. I had fun, celebrated
my birthday, and even got some ass from a guy I liked. (Vander Ven, 2011: 65)
It is possible that the relationship between drinking and hooking up is spurious. In some
instances, that is probably true. But the literature also suggests that drinking exerts an indirect
effect on pleasurable sex acts (e.g., Paul & Hayes, 2002; Vander Ven, 2011; Williams, 1998).
For example, a male student observed:
The likelihood of [hooking up] happening when you are totally sober is very unlikely, I
would say. It is only when people start loosening up by drinking, I call it liquid courage.
Most guys are shy about going up to pretty girls, [so that is why] I call it liquid courage.
They got enough courage up to go up and talk to the girl. And if she was the same status
regarding alcohol consumption, then the two people that are attracted to each other will
just go ahead and [hook up]. (Bogle, 2008: 168)
Another male student stated: “Sometimes it’s just something that happens, like you have
something to drink and you just feel this sudden attraction for someone and they feel this
attraction for you it just happens and it ends after that” (p. 47).

Economic Pain and Pleasure
Illicit drug marketplaces are infamous for predation. Users steal from other users as well
as dealers, who steal from their competitors and users (e.g., Jacques, Allen, & Wright, 2014;
Jacobs, 1999; Sandberg & Pedersen, 2009; Taylor, 2007). Moreover, robbers, burglars, and
defrauders steal from users and dealers (e.g., Jacobs, 2000; Morselli et al., 2017; Wright &
Decker, 1994, 1997), plus users steal from other people to afford their habit (e.g., Johnson et
al., 1985; Nurco, Kinlock, & Balter, 1993). Predation is not solely associated with illicit drugs. For
example, people steal alcohol from bars, liquor stores, grocery stores, their parents, friends, and
neighbors (e.g., Hearst et al., 2007; Jacques et al., 2016).
Perhaps no research says more about the quantity of economic pain than findings
published in two articles with John Ball at the head. In one, Ball, Shaffer, and Nurco (1983)
analyzed data gathered from a representative sample of male heroin addicts in metropolitan
Baltimore. The authors found “that the average addict committed over two thousand offences”
during a nine year period (p. 125). More specifically, the average addict over that time
perpetrated theft on about 829 days, among other crimes, to help support their drug habit. In
another article, Ball, Rosen, Flueck, and Nurco (1982) estimate the number of crimes committed
by heroin addicts in the United States per year and over their lifetime. The numbers are
startling, respectively exceeding 50 million and 819 million. Not all of these offenses are cases
of economic pain, but many thefts and robberies are instances of such.
Yet, drug-related economics is not all predatory. For instance, many illicit and licit
distributors earn income by making fair exchanges (e.g., Jacobs, 1999; Levitt & Venkatesh,
2000). Gifting is part of drug transfer, too (Jacques & Wright, 2008a). A significant percentage of
users and dealers act altruistically (Bright & Sutherland, 2017; Harrison et al., 2007). Perhaps
more than any other drug, marijuana is known as a beacon of generosity (Zimmerman &
Wieder, 1977). Exemplary quotes include “it’s just the culture of marijuana … I mean, you have

it, you share” and “I think it’s just an understanding that [if] you have something, you share it”
(Belackova & Vaccaro, 2013: 296). Dealers are expected to chip in their fair share (Jacques &
Wright, 2015). In his counterculture work, Steal This Book, Hoffman (1971: 98) righteously
states: “Giving dope away can be a real mind-blower. Every dealer should submit to voluntary
taxation by the Nation. If you are a conscientious dealer, you should be willing and eager to give
a good hunk of your stash away at special events or to groups into free distribution.”
Gifting occurs among persons involved in the perceptually “worst” drugs, too. For
example, Williams (1992: 44) observes: “There are peculiar contradictions in the crackhouse:
generosity and a willingness to look after others are as characteristic of the life as is the stingy
practice of stealing drugs from others.” The Global Drug Survey (2018b) asked cocaine users
about the amount they purchased for personal use but consumed by others. About 60% of
respondents shared a quarter to all of their cocaine. The survey also asked users about the
proportion of cocaine for which they paid. Only 1.3% reported all, whereas, at the opposite
extreme, nearly 20% reported none.
Sellers of hard drug sellers also give gifts. A person high in the methamphetamine world
asserts: “[A]ll good dealers give it to you to start with, always” (Shukla, 2016: 67). Maybe the
oldest theory is “pushers” are givers only to get people addicted and thereby make them into
steady clientele (Coomber, 2003, 2006). That ties into a more general theory: giving is good
business sense. As Adler (1993: 102) notes in Wheeling and Dealing: “Dealers and smugglers
liked doing business with righteous associates. By … throwing in extra bits of drugs for their
customer’s personal use … dealers built up good will with their colleagues in the community.”
Some dealers push people to buy from them, but customers are pushy with dealers, too.
Jacobs (1999: 68) writes of a crack-cocaine market: “[S]ellers confront a steady and predictable
barrage of users who are trying in some form or fashion to take them in [i.e., take advantage of
them]. The most innocuous of such attempts involves pleas for more crack than users are
willing or able to pay for. … Dealers reported these pleas to be linked … to proclamations of

affection.” Gifting among users may be seen as a sign of affection, as well; such is the case
among heroin addicts who share to starve off painful withdrawal symptoms (Bourgois &
Schonberg, 2009). Indeed, a general principle behind altruism is the golden rule – treat others
how you want to be treated. A marijuana user explained her gift giving thusly:
I know there are times when people come over and I don’t want to smoke what I have,
but I do anyways, because they’re my friends and I know they want to get high. There’s
always [the thought] that, I won’t have anything to smoke tomorrow morning or
something like that. But the more you share the more it comes back around to you …
whenever I do have it, which is usually, I do share it. People remember that. (Belackova
& Vaccaro, 2013: 299)

Social Pain and Pleasure
Drugs are associated with micro and macro forms of social pain, such as family
breakdown and declining social cohesion. These problems are evident in many urban
ethnographies, such as Anderson’s (1999) Code of the Street (also see, e.g., Harding, 2010;
Venkatesh, 2000). He gives examples of familial pain, like that caused by a wife and mother
whose “crack habit got completely out of control, and she gravitated to the streets to become a
prostitute to support her habit” (p. 46). And speaking to communal harm, he observes that
“drugs … have become deeply rooted in the inner-city black community, a situation largely
tolerated by civic authorities and the police. As law-abiding residents witness this situation, they
become ever more cynical and alienated” (p. 111).
Surprisingly to me, statistics on social pain are in short supply. It would be useful to have
more quantitative information on the connections between drug-involved behavior, interpersonal
relationships, and community. Nutt, King, and Phillips (2010: 1563) agree, noting, “Social harms
are harder to ascertain.” In turn, they cite a few quantitative studies that are germane to their
conception of social harm. I should restate that social harm, per their typology, is not wholly the
same as my conception of social pain. By coincidence, for example, the studies they cite as
bearing on social harm are not relevant to social pain. Specifically, they refer to “estimates

based on road traffic and other accidents at home, [and] “drug-related violence” (ibid.), which, in
my framework, are examples of drug-related corporal pain, not social pain. They also cite
studies on the “costs to economies in provider countries” (ibid.); in my framework, that is drugrelated economic pain, not social pain.
Despite the dearth of statistics, it is clear that drugs push people apart. However, it is
equally apparent that drugs facilitate interaction and glue some people into a community (e.g.,
Bourgois & Schonberg, 2009; Gallupe & Bouchard, 2015; Kreager, Rulison, & Moody, 2011;
Parker, Aldridge, & Measham, 1998). A case in point is the common saying, “Let’s get together
for a drink.” When people utter that phrase (and actually follow-up on it), they are using a drug
to promote social pleasure. They may also enjoy the corporal effects of alcohol, despite its
economic cost. Some people are so fond of a drug that they become deeply enmeshed in a
community devoted to the substance, which is its own source of pleasure. They may even travel
the world for that very purpose, as did John Locke and Thomas Jefferson owing to their love of
French wines (Phillips, 2016), or like the troves of marijuana enthusiasts who visit Amsterdam’s
coffeeshops (Leuw & Marshall, 1994).
People can acquire various drugs locally and thereby become enmeshed in their
respective subcultures and networks. A young drug user said of his high school drug scene,
“You’re like part of a community that’s always sociable” (Jacques & Wright, 2015: 20-1; also see
Carey, 1968; Mohamed & Fritsvold, 2010). Right or wrong, people may perceive drugs as one
of the few things to do together. Another young drug user put it this way: “I spent a lot of money
in high school on drugs, but there was nothing else to do. … There’s a lot more to it than getting
high. … It’s a very social thing. … That’s what we did. I don’t know what else you would do. We
don’t go to the arcade; we don’t do any of that shit. We don’t go to the ice cream parlor. We
drive around in our vehicles and smoke” (p. 21).
Drug selling may be primarily motivated by economic pleasure, but some dealers
appreciate its social benefits, too. A couple dealers commented, “I really met so many people

through it. A lot of them are acquaintances or whatever, but a lot of them became friends out of
it”; and, “I really met a lot of people through selling, and some of them have actually become
really good friends. Selling drugs has made me a lot of really good connections as far as good
friends go” (p. 23; also see Carey, 1968; Mohamed & Fritsvold, 2010). Similar to some alcoholinfused hook ups, drug dealing may lead to long-term, friendly relationships. The experience of
the following seller illustrates the point:
Most of my customers were my friends [before I started selling]. Some of them were just
acquaintances, but I mean a lot of people wanted to hang out with me more. Everybody
wants to hang out with a drug dealer. I started hanging out with a lot of people. I mean I
know a lot of people that weren’t the closest friends became closer friends with me. … I
was hanging out with them, and yeah, they were my friends. They became my friends,
and after I stopped dealing, they were still my good friends. (p. 23)
No doubt, drugs lead to social problems, including familial ones. Some of the abovequoted individuals experienced such, an example of which is provided in the next section. Yet,
drugs may also improve family relations. An anecdotal example is the untold number of drinks I
have shared with my mother to good effect. And, it may not be popular to admit it, but drugs
may even make a person into a better parent, partner, son, or daughter (e.g., Boeri, 2013;
Carbone-Lopez, Owens, & Miller, 2012). For example, a parent may have a cup of coffee to
keep up their energy, or maybe some methamphetamine:
I just thought that [meth] was the greatest thing in the world. … I could get so much
done. I could get, you know, we finished the basement and redid the floors in the kitchen
… [P]hysically I had the energy that could last me forever. … I would get my family at the
dinner table, and I’d run to the store to get whatever I had to get … I was constantly
running. I had one kind in swimming, one kid in judo, one kid that was just a social
butterfly. I was constantly on the go. I did events at my daughter’s school. Field trips. I
had to be at every single one. … I volunteered at every field trip. (Boeri, 2013: 54-5)

Discussion
This article’s purpose has been to further research on drug-involved pleasure to learn
about, and thereby inform control of, drug-involved pain. To further illustrate how, imagine that
theorists propose or researchers find causes of drug-involved pleasure. Because pain is the

opposite of pleasure, the theories and findings suggest circumstances that do not produce druginvolved pain. Likewise, theories and findings on the factors that produce pain should provide
insight into the factors that do not produce pleasure. Such information could then be used to
inform real-world efforts to control drug-involved pain, and, perhaps, even promote druginvolved pleasure.
The cross-fertilization of theories and findings is promoted by the widespread use of a
comprehensive and powerful conceptual framework, all the more so if it is simple, general, and
instrumental. That is why I propose the framework of drug-involved pain/pleasure that I did. For
the sake of the field, I encourage researchers to adopt the framework, think about the paths it
points toward, and act on them. Surely, for instance, more about mental and bodily deterioration
due to drug use would be learned by exploring its effect on corporal improvement. More about
sexual victimization would be learned from simultaneously considering how alcohol leads to
consensual hooking up. More about drug market predation would be learned from dually
attending to altruism. And, more about the social breakdown associated with drugs would be
learned from examining their association to relationship and community building.
It goes without saying that a powerful framework is of little use unless paired with theory
(Cooney & Phillips, 2002). An array of perspectives could be used to explain the causes of and
connections between pleasure and pain in their many manifestations (the dependent variables)
with various forms of drug involvement, such as use, possession, distribution, and production of
different drugs (the independent variables). The field will likely need to – and should – draw on
multiple disciplines (e.g., biology, economics, psychology, sociology) to wholly explain the
concepts proposed herein. To that point, researchers should keep in mind that the relationships
are likely contingent, meaning mediated or moderated by other variables, like “the type of
product involved, the people who buy and sell it, and the larger social environment in which the
commerce takes place” (Zimring & Hawkins, 1997, p. 153).

Concepts are inherently abstract, but they are not merely academic. Policymakers,
enforcers, and researchers should pay close attention to how their decision-making is affected
by their working typologies. As another illustration, imagine legislators or law enforcement
officials are deciding how to allocate limited resources toward controlling two drugs: “Drug A”
and “Drug B.” Researchers determine that A and B cause equal amounts of drug-related crime,
but only A produces non-criminal harm/pain. If government officials depend on the crime
typology to guide decision-making, they should decide to apply equally severe controls to A and
B. But if officials use the drug-involved harm or pain typologies, they should decide to more
severely control A than B. Taking the hypothetical scenario a step further, also imagine that
researchers determine A produces far more pleasure than pain, but B produces less pleasure
than pain. This finding is irrelevant if government officials only concern themselves with
preventing pain. In that case, they should do more to control A. Yet if the officials weigh pain
and pleasure, they should decide to more severely control B than A.
In short, those scenarios show that choosing between typologies matters in the real
world. However, evidence-based policy-making cannot proceed without quantifying the
phenomena in question. There is no one right way to quantify the pain and pleasure associated
with drug-involved behavior, but the field can help governments and “the people” by devising
sound procedures (Nutt, 2012). One possibility is to extend the strategy described by Nutt, King,
and Phillips (2010) to score harm: First, experts would choose pleasures to quantify, like those
illustrated herein. Next, experts would score drugs with points from 0 of 100, with 100 assigned
to the most pleasurable drug on a specific criterion, and 0 indicating no pleasure. The process
would be more complicated than just described (for details, see Nutt, King, and Phillips 2010),
but it would result in pleasure scores for various drugs. To determine their utility, the pain scores
would be subtracted from the pleasure scores.
Another possibility is to combine the above process with Bentham’s (2005 [1789]) ideas
on quantifying pain and pleasure. He proposes that for individuals, discrete cases of pain and

pleasure vary in four ways: intensity, duration, certainty, and propinquity.3 He refers to these as
“elements” or “dimensions” of pain and pleasure, the sum of which are its “value.” Thus, a case
has a greater value of pain or pleasure to the extent it is more intense, lasts longer, more likely
to occur, or occurs more quickly.
Post a discrete case of pain or pleasure (e.g., after someone is no longer intoxicated),
the initial act may lead to further pain or pleasure. Bentham refers to these long(er)-term effects
as fecundity and purity. The former is the likelihood that pleasure leads to pleasure and pain to
pain, whereas purity is the odds that pleasure leads to pain and vice versa. To illustrate these
concepts, I return to the relationships between drinking, sexual victimization, and hooking up
among college students. Pain leading to pain is evident in the physical trauma concurrent with
sexual assault turning into persistent psychological trauma (e.g., Brown, Testa, & MessmanMoore, 2009; Schwartz & Leggett, 1999). Pleasure to pleasure is seen in any relationship that
starts with an alcohol-infused hook-up and turns into a committed relationship (e.g., Bogle,
2008). An example of pleasure leading to pain is the contraction of an STD during an otherwise
enjoyable hook-up, or the embarrassment and shame of a drunken one night stand. For
instance, a female student admitted: “We were at this party, drinking. We had sex … I kicked
myself in the ass because beer goggles made me a pick a dog” (Paul & Hayes, 2002, p. 655).
Finally, Bentham (2005 [1789], p. 39) specifies a seventh aspect of quantifying pain and
pleasure: “Its extent; that is, the number of persons to whom it extends; or in other words who
are affected by it.” An example is how the pleasure-motive of drug dealing results in familial
pain. Consider how a seller’s mother and father reacted to learning of his illegal activity:
I was down and felt like shit. My parents knew that I was selling weed, and my parents
thought that I was a bad person because of it. … My dad said I was an idiot. … He just
talked down to me like I wasn’t a person, you know, like I was a fucking dog or
something. … My mom was like, “I can’t believe this has happened, but it’s alright. I still
love you.” … She said I was lucky they didn’t kill me. Mom was just scared. (Jacques &
Wright, 2008b, p. 1020)

3

Criminologists often refer to intensity and duration as severity, and propinquity as celerity.

In sum, there are seven elements of pain’s and pleasure’s value: intensity; duration;
certainty; propinquity; fecundity; purity; and, extent. After outlining and describing those,
Bentham (2005 [1789]) proceeds with ideas on how these elements could be used to quantify
the “general tendency” of a (drug-involved) behavior to be associated with pain or pleasure:
Begin by focusing on the people most immediately affected by the behavior; for them, determine
the value of each pleasure and each pain produced by its first instance and thereafter. Next,
sum the pleasures and the pains; if there is more pleasure than pain, the behavior has a “good
tendency” with respect to the interests of individuals, otherwise a “bad tendency.” The final part
of the process provides the values on which governments should mark out certain behaviors as
“good” or “evil,” and control them accordingly:
Take an account of the number of persons whose interests appear to be concerned; and
repeat the above process with respect to each. Sum up the numbers expressive of the
degrees of good tendency, which the act has, with respect to each individual, in regard
to whom the tendency of it is good upon the whole: do this again with respect to each
individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is good upon the whole: do this again
with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is bad upon the
whole. Take the balance which if on the side of pleasure, will give the general good
tendency of the act, with respect to the total number or community of individuals
concerned; if on the side of pain, the general evil tendency, with respect to the same
community. (p. 40)

Conclusion
I end with a thought on morals: At present, the field and drug policy reflect Epicurus’
(2012) notion of right and wrong. For him, the greatest good is the elimination of pain, which
may require suppressing the desire for pleasure. Other hedonists, most prominently Bentham
(2005 [1789]), argue that in addition to minimizing pain, pleasure should be maximized. Social
science involves conceptualizing, theorizing, and researching morals, but it cannot tell us which
morals are right (Black, 2013; but see Becker, 1967). Thus, the field cannot determine if drug
policy should be more in the shadow of Epicurus or Bentham. Still, research on drug-involved
pleasure should be of high importance because it informs knowledge of drug-involved pain and

how to control it. Though not in the way meant by Bentham, knowledge of pain and pleasure are
required to maximize good governance.
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FIGURES AND TABLES; in order mentioned in body

Figure 1. Drug-Involved Crime Typology

Figure 2. Drug-Involved Harm Typology

Table 1. Examples of Harm to Users and Others: Physical, Psychological, Social
Overall Harm
Harm to Users
Harm to Others
Physical
Lethal overdose; Life shortened
Chance of physical injury both directly
due to, eg, road traffic accidents, and indirectly, eg, violence, traffic
lung cancers, HIV, suicide;
accident, fetal harm, drug waste,
Cirrhosis, seizures, strokes,
secondary transmission of blood-borne
cardiomyopathy, stomach ulcers; viruses
Sexual unwanted activities, selfharm, blood-borne viruses,
emphysema, damage from
cutting agents
Psychological Continued use despite adverse
Chance of psychological injury both
consequences; Amfetaminedirectly and indirectly, eg, violence,
induced psychosis, ketamine
traffic accident, fetal harm, drug waste,
intoxication; Mood disorders
secondary transmission of blood-borne
secondary to drug-user’s lifestyle viruses
or drug us
Social
Loss of income, housing, job,
Increase in volume of acquisitive crime
educational achievements,
(beyond the use-of-drug act) directly or
criminal record, imprisonment;
indirectly (at the population level, not the
Loss of relationship with family
individual level); Toxic waste from
and friends
amfetamine factories, discarded
needles; Family breakdown, economic
wellbeing, emotional wellbeing, future
prospects of children, child neglect;
Deforestation, destabilization of
countries, international crime, new
markets; Direct costs of, eg, health care,
police, prisons, social services, customs,
insurance, crime, and indirect costs, eg,
loss of productivity, absenteeism;
Decline in social cohesion and decline in
the reputation of the community
Note: Adapted from Nutt, King, & Phillips (2010, p. 1560).

Figure 3. Original Formulation of Drug-Involved Pain Typology

Figure 4. Final Formulation of Drug-Involved Pain and Pleasure Typologies

Table 2. Examples of Drug-Specific and -Related Pain: Corporal, Economic, Social
Overall Pain
Drug-Specific Pain
Drug-Related Pain
Corporal
Lethal overdose;
Life shortened due to, eg, road traffic accidents, lung
cirrhosis, seizures,
cancers, HIV, suicide; Sexual unwanted activities,
strokes,
self-harm, blood-borne viruses, emphysema,
cardiomyopathy,
damage from cutting agents; Chance of injury to
stomach ulcers;
others both directly and indirectly, eg, violence, traffic
Continued use despite accident, fetal harm, drug waste, secondary
adverse
transmission of blood-borne viruses; Mood disorders
consequences;
secondary to drug-user’s lifestyle or drug use;
Amfetamine-induced
Emotional wellbeing of family
psychosis, ketamine
intoxication
Economic
Loss of income, housing, job, educational
achievements, criminal record, imprisonment;
Increase in volume of acquisitive crime (beyond the
use-of-drug act) directly or indirectly (at the
population level, not the individual level); Toxic waste
from amfetamine factories, discarded needles; future
prospects of children; Deforestation, … international
crime, new markets; Direct costs to the country (eg,
health care, police, prisons, social services, customs,
insurance, crime) and indirect costs (eg, loss of
productivity, absenteeism)
Social
Loss of relationship with family and friends; Family
breakdown, … child neglect; [D]estabilization of
countries; Decline in social cohesion and decline in
the reputation of the community
Note: The environment is a resource and thus harm to the environment is a facet of economic
pain.

